Independent comparison of popular DPI tools for traffic classification by Bujlow, Tomasz et al.
Independent Comparison of Popular DPI Tools for Traffic Classification
Tomasz Bujlowa,∗, Valentín Carela-Españolb, Pere Barlet-Rosb
aSection for Networking and Security, Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, DK-9220 Aalborg East, Denmark
bBroadband Communications Research Group, Department of Computer Architecture, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, ES-08034 Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is the state-of-the-art technology for traffic classification. According to the conventional wisdom,
DPI is the most accurate classification technique. Consequently, most popular products, either commercial or open-source, rely
on some sort of DPI for traffic classification. However, the actual performance of DPI is still unclear to the research community,
since the lack of public datasets prevent the comparison and reproducibility of their results. This paper presents a comprehensive
comparison of 6 well-known DPI tools, which are commonly used in the traffic classification literature. Our study includes 2
commercial products (PACE and NBAR) and 4 open-source tools (OpenDPI, L7-filter, nDPI, and Libprotoident). We studied their
performance in various scenarios (including packet and flow truncation) and at different classification levels (application protocol,
application and web service). We carefully built a labeled dataset with more than 750 K flows, which contains traffic from popular
applications. We used the Volunteer-Based System (VBS), developed at Aalborg University, to guarantee the correct labeling of the
dataset. We released this dataset, including full packet payloads, to the research community. We believe this dataset could become
a common benchmark for the comparison and validation of network traffic classifiers. Our results present PACE, a commercial tool,
as the most accurate solution. Surprisingly, we find that some open-source tools, such as nDPI and Libprotoident, also achieve very
high accuracy.
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1. Introduction
Network communication became the standard way of ex-
changing information between applications located on different
hosts. The exchanged application-layer data is segmented and
encapsulated into IP packets, which are transmitted through the
network. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) tools analyze the con-
tent of the packets by searching for specific patterns (i.e., signa-
tures). Thus, DPI became one of the fundamental traffic anal-
ysis methods for many tools performing traffic classification,
network management, intrusion detection, and network foren-
sics.
DPI-based traffic classification relies on a database of charac-
teristic signatures of protocols (e.g., HTTP, or POP3), applica-
tions (e.g., Skype, or BitTorrent), and web services (e.g., Face-
book, or YouTube). These signatures must be initially extracted
and kept up to date in order to adapt them to the continuous evo-
lution of the applications (e.g., new applications, new versions,
new obfuscation techniques). They are later employed, usually
in an online phase, to classify the traffic flowing in a network.
The pattern matching algorithms for online classification are
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computationally complex and usually require expensive hard-
ware. Nevertheless, DPI is commonly considered as the most
accurate technique for traffic classification, and most commer-
cial solutions rely on it [1, 2, 3, 4].
The scientific literature shows that the existing traffic clas-
sification techniques give accurate results. Unfortunately, as
pointed out in [5], there are numerous problems with the com-
parison and validation of these techniques. The quality of the
validation process directly depends on the methods used to
build and pre-classify the ground-truth dataset, so it is not an
easy task to compare how various classifiers perform. The re-
searchers must choose between two approaches of ground-truth
establishment: creating their own dataset, or using an already
existing dataset created by someone else.
The first approach requires the researcher to build and la-
bel the dataset by himself. Both of these tasks are challenging.
Building the dataset involves the selection of the applications
to be included in the dataset. Data labeling is usually carried
out by DPI tools given their presumably high accuracy. How-
ever, the actual accuracy of DPI-based tools is still not clear,
as the previous works that tried to compare the performance of
different DPI tools showed that the ground-truth used to vali-
date the proposals was obtained through port-based classifiers,
other DPI-based tools, or methodologies of unknown reliabil-
ity [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Thus, the results of the comparison are
arguable. In addition, most commercial tools are black boxes
that claim high accuracy based on their own studies, which can-
not be validated, because they were performed using private
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datasets.
The second approach to the proper validation of traffic clas-
sification techniques is the use of publicly available datasets.
This way, it is easier to compare the results obtained from dif-
ferent tools. Examples are the datasets published by the Co-
operative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [11]
or the Internet Measurement Data Catalog [12]. Although the
datasets are pre-classified, the actual reliability of this label-
ing is unknown, which is a very important factor for testing
traffic classifiers. Most of the traces have no payload or just
the first bytes of each packet. The MAWI repository [13] con-
tains various packet traces, including daily 15-minutes traces
made at an trans-Pacific line (150 Mbit/s link). The bandwidth
of this link has changed through the years. The traces contain
the first 96 bytes of the payload and the traffic is usually asym-
metric. Another useful data source is the Community Resource
for Archiving Wireless Data At Dartmouth (CRAWDAD) [14],
which stores wireless trace data from many contributing loca-
tions. Another interesting project is The Waikato Internet Traf-
fic Storage (WITS) [15], which aims to collect and document
all the Internet traces that the WAND Network Research Group
from the University of Waikato has in their possession. Some
of the traces can be freely downloaded and they contain traffic
traces from various areas and of different types (as DSL resi-
dential traffic, university campus traffic, etc). Most of the traces
do not have payload (i.e., it is zeroed) or truncated. All these
datasets although useful for many network evaluations are of
limited interest for DPI validation given that no correct labeling
can be performed on them.
Szabo et al. [16] introduced a method for validation of clas-
sification algorithms, which is independent of other classifica-
tion methods, deterministic, and allows to automatize testing of
large data sets. The authors developed a Windows XP driver
based on the Network Driver Interface Specification (NDIS) li-
brary. Another approach to obtain the ground-truth was taken
in [17]. The authors created a tool, which collects the data
from the network and labels the flows with the real applica-
tion names (e.g., Thunderbird) and application protocol names
(e.g., SMTP). This tool is similar to our Volunteer-Based Sys-
tem (VBS), which was used in our work for the ground-truth
generation and is further described in Section 3.1.1. Yet another
way of establishing the ground-truth was shown in [18], which
describes a system developed to accelerate the manual verifica-
tion process. The authors proposed Ground Truth Verification
System (GTVS) based on the DPI signatures derived from the
databases available in the Internet, including L7-filter. GTVS,
however, does not collect the application names from the op-
erating systems, so the established truth cannot be completely
verified.
In a former conference paper [19], we tried to face the prob-
lem of ground-truth reliability. We described various methods
of obtaining the ground-truth for testing various traffic clas-
sification tools. As part of the evaluation, we tested several
DPI-based traffic classifiers and assessed if they can be used
for obtaining reliable ground-truth. This paper is not only an
extension but a more broad and comprehensive validation of
DPI-based tools. The focus of this paper is different, as we di-
rectly compare the selected DPI tools regarding their per-class
accuracy. Reference datasets used in this paper as well as the
previous one are generated by the same methodology further
explained in Section 3. However, both datasets are significantly
different. The dataset used in this paper is significantly larger
than the one used in the conference paper. Furthermore, the new
dataset also contains labeled non-HTTP flows belonging to var-
ious web services, which is a unique feature. The methodology
of testing the classifiers is also different. In our previous paper,
we tested the accuracy of the classifiers on a single level. In the
current paper, we evaluate different levels (i.e., application, web
service, etc), so the new evaluation method is more detailed and
complete.
This paper compares and validates six well-known DPI-
based tools used for network traffic classification. In order to
allow the validation of our work, we publish the reliable labeled
dataset used to perform our study. Two main aspects have been
carefully addressed when building this dataset: the reliability of
the labeling and the representativeness of the data. We used the
VBS tool [20] to guarantee the correctness of the labeling pro-
cess. This tool, described in Section 3, is able to label the flows
with the name of the process that creates them. This allowed us
to create a reliable ground-truth that can be used as a reference
benchmark for the research community to compare other pro-
posals. The selection of applications for our dataset was made
based on well-known indexes of the most commonly used Inter-
net applications and web services. In order to allow the publica-
tion of the dataset and avoid any privacy issues, we created the
traffic by running a large set of applications and meticulously
simulating common behaviors of the users.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• We published a reliable labeled dataset with full packet
payloads. The dataset, further described in Section 4, con-
tains traffic from a diverse set of commonly used appli-
cations. Although artificially created, we carefully simu-
lated human behaviors in order to produce a dataset that is
as much realistic as possible. This dataset can be used by
the research community to test and compare various traffic
classifiers.
• We compared six well-known DPI-based tools widely
used for network traffic classification. Using the previous
dataset, we evaluated the precision of PACE, OpenDPI,
nDPI, L7-filter, Libprotoident, and NBAR, and compared
their results on various classification levels and in differ-
ent scenarios. We are aware that OpenDPI and L7-filter
are abandoned projects, on which development stopped
several years ago. However, we decided to include them
into our evaluation as a reference and for completeness, as
many existing scientific papers base their results on these
two classifiers.
• We provide an independent and impartial analysis of the
performance of these tools at different classification levels.
These results can help researchers to better understand the
accuracy of the different tools used to set their ground truth
2
Table 1: DPI tools included in our comparison
Name Version Released Apps. identified
PACE 1.47.2 November 2013 1000
OpenDPI 1.3.0 June 2011 100
nDPI rev. 7543 April 2014 170
L7-filter 2009.05.28 May 2009 110
Libprotoident 2.0.7 November 2013 250
NBAR 15.2(4)M2 November 2012 85
as well as network managers to better decide which DPI-
based classifiers are more suitable for their needs and sce-
narios. Indirectly, we also provide the information about
the reliability of those non-DPI classification techniques
proposed in the literature that used one of the DPI tools
compared in this paper to set their ground truth.
In this paper, we focus on a single performance parameter:
the classification accuracy. We acknowledge that other perfor-
mance parameters are also important, such as speed, scalabil-
ity, complexity, robustness, or price of the solutions. How-
ever, given that the research community is mainly using DPI-
based technique for oﬄine ground-truth generation, we think
that those metrics are less decisive. Furthermore, we believe
that our dataset will be useful to evaluate most of these param-
eters as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the DPI-based tools and their configurations
used for the evaluation. Section 3 presents the methodology
used to obtain the reliable dataset that is described in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the results of the performance evaluation of
the different DPI-based tools. Section 6 discusses the results,
compares them with the literature, and comments the limita-
tions of our evaluation. Section 7 reviews the related work.
Finally, Section 8 concludes and summarizes the outcomes and
contributions of the paper.
2. Classification tools
On the market, there are many available DPI-based traffic
classification solutions. For our experiment, we selected PACE,
OpenDPI, nDPI, Libprotoident, NBAR, and L7-filter, which
will be broadly introduced in this section. The selection was
based on the popularity of the tools used in the scientific lit-
erature or embedded in the operating systems available on the
market to classify the traffic or set the ground truth. In particu-
lar, we evaluated those tools available to researchers, including
most popular open source tools, as well as those commercial
tools whose vendors accepted to share with us free of charge.
Table 1 summarizes these DPI-based tools along their charac-
teristics.
PACE. It is a proprietary classification library developed by
ipoque entirely in C, which supports classical DPI (pattern
matching), behavioral, heuristic, and statistical analysis. Ac-
cording to its website, PACE is able to detect encrypted pro-
tocols as well as protocols which use obfuscation. Overall,
more than 1000 applications and 200 network protocols are sup-
ported. It is also possible to include user-defined rules for de-
tection of applications and protocols. To the best of our knowl-
edge, PACE is the only commercial tool used in the literature to
build the ground truth [8].
OpenDPI. It was an open-source classifier derived from early
versions of PACE by removing support for encrypted proto-
cols, as well as all performance optimizations. The project
is now considered as closed. In [6, 7], the authors mention
that OpenDPI is not a classic DPI tool, as it uses other tech-
niques apart from pattern matching (i.e., behavioral and statis-
tical analysis). Thanks to that, it should severely reduce the
amount of false classification, but some traffic can remain un-
classified [6]. Another interesting feature is flow association,
which relies on inspecting the payload of a known flow to dis-
cover a new flow, as inspecting a control FTP session to obtain
the five tuple of the newly initiated data session [10].
nDPI. It is an OpenDPI fork, which is optimized and extended
with new protocols [21]. It re-introduced support for many en-
crypted ones due to analysis of session certificates. Overall,
nDPI for now supports more than 100 protocols [22]. The cur-
rent architecture is scalable, but it does not provide the best
performance and results: each of the protocols has its own sig-
nature scanner, through which the packets are examined. Every
packet is examined by each scanner, regardless, if a match was
found. If there are multiple matches per flow, the returned value
is the most detailed one [10]. Additionally, there is no TCP or
IP payload re-assembly, so there is no possibility to detect a
signature split into multiple TCP segments / IP packets [22].
Libprotoident. This C library [8] introduces Lightweight
Packet Inspection (LPI), which examines only the first four
bytes of payload in each direction. That allows to minimize pri-
vacy concerns, while decreasing the disk space needed to store
the packet traces necessary for the classification. Libprotoident
supports over 200 different protocols and the classification is
based on a combined approach using payload pattern matching,
payload size, port numbers, and IP matching.
Cisco Network Based Application Recognition (NBAR). It was
developed to add the ability to classify the network traffic by
using the existing infrastructure [23]. It is able to classify ap-
plications, which use dynamic TCP and UDP port numbers.
NBAR works with Quality of Service (QoS) features, thanks to
what the devices (e.g., routers) can dynamically assign a certain
amount of bandwidth to a particular application, drop packets,
or mark them in a selected way. The authors claim that NBAR
supports a wide range of stateful protocols, which are difficult
to classify.
L7-filter. It was created in 2003 as a classifier for Linux Net-
filter, which can recognize the traffic on the application layer
[24]. The classification is based on three techniques. At first,
simple numerical identification based on the standard iptables
modules, which can handle port numbers, IP protocol numbers,
number of transferred bytes, etc. At second, payload pattern
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matching based on regular expressions. At third, the applica-
tions can be recognized based on functions. L7-filter is devel-
oped as a set of rules and a classification engine, which can
be used independently of each other. The most recent version
of L7-filter classification engine is from January, 2011, and the
classification rules from 2009.
3. Methodology
Our experiment involved numerous steps, which will be de-
fined and described in this section. We had two main goals –
building the dataset and testing the classifiers. Each of them
required an individual methodology.
3.1. Building of the dataset
3.1.1. The testbed
Our testbed consisted of 7 machines, which were used for
running the selected applications and generating the traffic data,
and of a server. We equipped the data generating machines with
Windows 7 (3 machines), Ubuntu (3 machines), and Windows
XP (1 machine). The additional Ubuntu server machine was
equipped with a MySQL database for data storage.
To collect and accurately label the flows, we adapted the
Volunteer-Based System (VBS) developed at Aalborg Univer-
sity [25]. The goal of the VBS project is to collect flow-level
information from the Internet traffic (e.g., start time of the flow,
number of packets contained by the flow, local and remote IP
addresses, local and remote ports, transport layer protocol) to-
gether with detailed information about each packet (e.g., direc-
tion, size, TCP flags, and relative timestamp to the previous
packet in the flow). For each flow, the system collects the pro-
cess name associated with it, which is obtained from the sys-
tem sockets. Additionally, the system collects some informa-
tion about the types of the transferred HTTP contents (e.g., tex-
t/html, video/x-flv). The captured information is transmitted to
the VBS server, which stores the data in a MySQL database.
On every data generating machine, we installed a modified
version of VBS. The source code of the original system as
well as the modified version is publicly available in [26] under
GNU General Public License v3.0. The modified version of the
VBS client captures, apart from the data described above, full
Ethernet frames for each packet, and extracts the HTTP URL
and Referrer fields – all the information is transmitted to the
server, and stored in the MySQL database. We added a module
called pcapBuilder, which is responsible for dumping the pack-
ets from the database to PCAP files. At the same time, INFO
files are generated to provide detailed information about each
flow, which allows us to assign each packet from the PCAP file
to an individual flow.
3.1.2. Selection of the data
The process of building a representative dataset, which char-
acterizes a typical user behavior, is a challenging task, crucial
from the point of testing and comparing different traffic classi-
fiers. Therefore, to ensure the proper diversity and amount of
the included data, we decided to combine the data on a mul-
tidimensional level. Based on w3schools statistics [27], we
found that most PC users use Windows 7 (56.7 % of users),
Windows XP (12.4 %), Windows 8 (9.9 %), and Linux (4.9 %)
- state for October 2013. Apple computers contribute for 9.6 %
of the overall traffic, and mobile devices for 3.3 %. Because of
the lack of the equipment and/or software for Apple computers,
Windows 8, and mobile devices, we decided to include in our
study Windows 7 (W7), Windows XP (XP), and Linux (LX),
which cover now 74.0 % of the used operating systems.
The application protocols, applications, and web services se-
lected for this study are shown below. To group them, we
adopted the same classification categories used in the reports
from Palo Alto [28].
1. File-sharing applications. According to [28], they account
for 6 % of the total bandwidth. Inside that group, BitTor-
rent accounts for 53 %, FTP for 21 %, Dropbox for 5 %,
Xunlei for 4 %, and eMule for 3 %. Based on the statis-
tics found in [28], as well as those in the CNET [29] and
the OPSWAT P2P clients popularity list, the CNET FTP
clients popularity list [30], and the Direct Download pop-
ularity list [31], we selected the following applications:
• BitTorrent: uTorrent (Windows), kTorrent (Linux).
• eDonkey: eMule (Windows), aMule (Linux).
The studied configurations were: outgoing-non-
obfuscated-incoming-all, all-obfuscated.
• FTP: FileZilla (Windows, Linux) in active mode
(PORT) and passive mode (PASV).
• Dropbox (Windows, Linux).
• Web-based direct downloads: 4Shared (+ Windows
app), MediaFire, Putlocker.
• Webdav (Windows).
2. Photo-video group. According to the reports from Palo
Alto [28], they account for 16 % of the total bandwidth,
where YouTube accounts for 6 % of total, Netflix for 2 %
of total, other HTTP video for 2 % of total, RTMP for 2 %
of total, and others for 4 % of traffic in total. To select
the applications in this category we also used the Ebizmba
ranking of video websites [32].
• YouTube: most watched videos from all the times
according to the global ranking [33].
• RTMP: around 30 random short live video streams
(1–10 minutes) were watched from Justin.tv.
• Vimeo – a web-based photo sharing solution.
• PPStream (Windows) – P2P streaming video soft-
ware.
• Other HTTP video.
3. Web browsing traffic. Based on w3schools statistics [34],
the most popular web browsers are: Chrome (48.4 % of
users), Firefox (30.2 %), and Internet Explorer (14.3 %).
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These browsers were used to generate the web traffic. Ac-
cording to the reports from Palo Alto [28], they account for
20 % of the total bandwidth. The selection of the websites
was based on Alexa statistics [35], Ebizmba web statis-
tics [36], Quantcast statistics [37], and Ebizmba search en-
gines popularity [38]. In order to make the dataset as rep-
resentative as possible, we simulated different human be-
haviors when using these websites. For instance, on Face-
book, we log in, interact with friends (e.g., chat, send mes-
sages, write in their walls), upload pictures, create events
or play games. Similar behaviors were simulated for other
popular web services, such as Twitter, Google+, eBay, etc.
The detailed description of actions performed with the ser-
vices is listed in our technical report [39].
4. Encrypted tunnel traffic. According to the reports from
Palo Alto [28], they account for 9 % of the total bandwidth,
where 6 % of total is SSL and 2 % of total is SSH.
• SSL (Windows, Linux): collected while using vari-
ous applications and web services.
• SSH (Linux).
• TOR (Windows). First, we used TOR to browse var-
ious websites and download big files. Then, we con-
figured TOR to act as an internal relay, so we partic-
ipated in creating the invisible path for other users.
• Freenet (Windows): for browsing the intranet and
also as a relay for other peers.
• SOCKSv5 (Windows). We created a SOCKSv5
server on Linux, and used it for Firefox and uTor-
rent.
5. Storage-backup traffic. According to Palo Alto [28], they
account for 16 % of the total bandwidth, where at least half
of the bandwidth is consumed by MS-SMB, and the rest
by many different applications. Therefore, the only tested
application was MS-SMB (Windows, Linux).
6. E-mail and communication traffic. According to the re-
ports from Palo Alto [28], e-mail traffic accounts for 3 %
of the total bandwidth. E-mail market share from Octo-
ber 2013 [40] shows that only one desktop mail client,
Microsoft Outlook (17 %), is in the top 10 of used mail
clients. The rest is split between web-based clients (as
GMail) and mobile clients (Mac, Android). The tested
applications / web-based mail services include: Gmail,
Hotmail, Windows Live Mail (Windows), and Mozilla
Thunderbird (Windows). The desktop e-mail applica-
tions (Windows Live Mail and Mozilla Thunderbird) were
tested to use various protocols: SMTP-PLAIN (port 587),
SMTP-TLS (port 465), POP3-PLAIN (port 110), POP3-
TLS (port 995), IMAP-STARTTLS (port 143), and IMAP-
TLS (port 993). We also tested Skype between Windows
and Android OS: video sessions, voice conversations, and
file transfers.
7. Management traffic. DNS, ICMP, NETBIOS, NTP, RDP.
8. Games. Based on the most played online games in USA
according to DFC Intelligence [41], we selected:
• League of Legends (Windows) – with all launchers.
• World of Warcraft (Windows) – including all launch-
ers.
• Pando Media Booster (Windows) – a process added
by League of Legends to seed the game installer to
other users, which oﬄoads the servers, because the
download is performed in the P2P mode. It generates
enormous accounts of traffic and fills the connection.
• Steam – delivers a range of games straight to a com-
puter’s desktop. Includes automatic updates, lists of
games and prices, posters, plus access to a large num-
ber of games. We included Steam on the list as it is a
platform for numerous games.
• America’s Army – a popular game from Steam.
9. Others. This category includes:
• Music applications: Spotify, iTunes (Windows).
• P2P Internet TVs: PPLive, Sopcast (Windows).
3.2. Testing of the DPI tools
The process of testing different DPI tools is complex and,
therefore, we split it into several parts: labeling of the data,
the classification process, and analysis of the classification logs.
Some of the steps can be different for some DPIs than for the
others – in these cases the differences are explicitly highlighted.
We evaluate only one performance parameter: the classification
accuracy. We acknowledge that other performance parameters
are also important, such as speed, scalability, complexity, ro-
bustness, or price of the solutions, however, their evaluation is
outside the scope of this paper.
3.2.1. Labeling of the data
All the flows stored in the database need to be properly
marked by attaching to them the labels of the applications, ap-
plication protocols, web services, types of the content, or Inter-
net domains. One flow can be associated with multiple labels.
Flows, which are not labeled, are not taken into consideration
while extracting them to PCAP files.
We classify the flows at different levels. We start the labeling
process by identifying the web flows and assigning them to the
selected web services. Every web service is identified by a set
of domains. The domains were chosen based on the number
of their occurrences in the collected HTTP flows. The HTTP
flows are marked with a web service label only if they contain
the traffic from the matching domains. In case the flow con-
tains traffic from domains belonging to multiple services (or to
domains, which are not assigned to the selected services), the
flow is left as unlabeled. The HTTP flows are also marked with
the labels of the type of the transmitted content (e.g., video/x-
flv), if they transmit audio or video. Those flows that are not
HTTP belonging to the web services (e.g., SSL) are labeled
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using an heuristic method as follows. To be recognized as a
non-HTTP web flow, the application name associated with the
flow should be the name of a web browser (e.g., chrome), a
name of a web browser plugin (e.g., plugin-container, flashgc-
play), or the name should be missing. Then, we look at the
HTTP flows, which were originated from 2 minutes before to 2
minutes after the non-HTTP flow. If all the corresponding (i.e.,
originated from the same local machine and reaching the same
remote host) HTTP flows have a web service label assigned,
and the service label is the same for all of the flows, the non-
HTTP flow is classified with the same web service label.
Afterwards, we identify the application protocols. The ap-
plication protocol label is applied only to those flows for which
we are sure that transmit the specific application protocol. Fi-
nally, we identify the applications. We consider applications
and protocols individually because, for example, a web-browser
may use many different protocols besides HTTP, or a BitTorrent
client can connect to websites to download files using HTTP or
SSL, etc.
3.2.2. The classification process
The packets were extracted into PCAP files in 3 different
modes: the normal one, with truncated packets (i.e., Ethernet
frames were overwritten by 0s after the 70th byte), and with
truncated flows (we extracted only 10 first packets for each
flow). We designed a tool, called dpi_benchmark, which is able
to read the PCAP files and provide the packets one-by-one to
PACE, OpenDPI, L7-filter, nDPI, and Libprotoident. All the
flows are started and terminated based on the information from
the INFO files, which contain the timestamps. After the last
packet of the flow is sent to the classifier, the tool obtains the
label associated with that flow. The labels are written to the
log files together with the flow identifier, which makes us later
able to relate the classification results to the original flows in
the database.
We used the default configurations of all classifiers except for
L7-filter, which was evaluated in two different configurations.
The first version (L7-filter-all) had all the patterns activated , but
the patterns marked as overmatching by their authors have a low
priority. For the second version (L7-filter-com) we adapted the
methodology proposed in [42], which does not activate the pat-
terns declared as overmatching and the default pattern priorities
were modified.
Classification by NBAR required to build a complete working
environment. We did not have any Cisco device that could be
used for the experiment. Therefore, we used GNS3 – a graph-
ical framework, which uses Dynamips to emulate our Cisco
hardware. We emulated 7200 platform, since this is the only
platform supported by GNS3 that can run the newest version of
Cisco IOS (version 15), which contains Flexible NetFlow. Pre-
vious versions of Cisco IOS contain only traditional NetFlow,
which does not support NBAR reporting on the per flow ba-
sis. We connected the virtual router to a real computer by using
a virtual interface. The router was configured to use Flexible
NetFlow with NBAR on the created interface.
Every flow recognized by Flexible NetFlow was tagged by
the application name obtained from NBAR. On the computer,
we used tcpreplay to replay the PCAP files to the router with
the maximal speed that did not cause packet loss. At the same
time, we used nfacctd, which is part of PMACCT tools [43], to
capture the Flexible NetFlow records sent by the router to the
computer.
The data stored in the classification logs was processed and
imported back to the database. We matched the log records to
the proper flows in the database using the flow identifier con-
tained by each flow record. NBAR relies on Flexible NetFlow,
which treats the flows in a unidirectional way. It means that
we needed to assess the type of the bi-directional flow based on
2 unidirectional flows (inbound and outbound). In most of the
cases the label from both unidirectional flows were the same.
In a few cases there was only an inbound or an outbound flow,
since there were no packets going in the opposite direction. In
case, both unidirectional flows existed and the label of each of
them was different, the bidirectional flow got the label from the
unidirectional flow that accounted for more bytes.
3.3. Analysis of the results
The method for analysis of the results depend on the level of
classification on which the flows were labeled:
• Application protocol level, such as DNS, HTTP, or POP3:
To consider the classification as correct, the label reported
by the classifier must be an application protocol (e.g.,
DNS, HTTP), but not at a different level (e.g., FLASH,
YOUTUBE). This is useful to test if the tool can recog-
nize the specific application protocol. If the result is given
at a different level, the flow is considered as unclassified.
However, the same flow will be classified as correct during
other tests at different levels, when we for example look
for a web service called YouTube. Those flows with labels
belonging to different application protocols, and services
and applications that do not belong to this application pro-
tocol are considered as wrong.
• Web service level, such as Yahoo or YouTube: the classi-
fication is considered to be correct only if the name of the
web service is given. If it is given at a different level, such
as HTTP or FLASH, the flow is considered as unclassified.
• Application level (when the application uses its proprietary
application-level protocols). For example, uTorrent and
Skype applications can use multiple protocols, including
their proprietary protocols called respectively Skype and
BitTorrent, and other protocols, such as HTTP or SSL. For
example, HTTP and SSL can be used to connect to the
web server to download the user’s data or advertisements.
Therefore, in the case of Skype, flows labeled by DPI tools
as Skype, HTTP, SSL are all marked as correct.
• Application level (when the application does not use its
proprietary application-level protocols, but directly uses
HTTP, SSL, etc.) It concerns for example Spotify. Then,
only the flows marked as Spotify are considered to be la-
beled correctly, as no specific application-level protocol
exists for this application, so we expect the application
name itself to be identified.
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Table 2: Application protocols in the dataset
App. protocol Flows Megabytes
DNS 18251 7.66
HTTP 43127 7325.44
ICMP 205 2.34
IMAP-STARTTLS 35 36.56
IMAP-TLS 103 410.23
NETBIOS Name Service 10199 11.13
NETBIOS Session Service 11 0.01
SAMBA Session Service 42808 450.39
NTP 42227 6.12
POP3-PLAIN 26 189.25
POP3-TLS 101 147.68
RTMP 378 2353.67
SMTP-PLAIN 67 62.27
SMTP-TLS 52 3.37
SOCKSv5 1927 898.31
SSH 38961 844.87
Webdav 57 59.91
Thanks to this multilevel testing approach, we obtained the
knowledge of which classifier is able to provide results on each
particular level of classification. This knowledge would allow,
for example, the end user to adjust the choice of the DPI tech-
nique according to the desired level of classification.
4. Dataset
Our basic dataset (without truncated packets or flows) con-
tains 767 690 flows, which account for 53.31 GB of pure
packet data. The application name was present for 759 720
flows (98.96 % of all the flows), which account for 51.93 GB
(97.41 %) of the data volume. The remaining flows are un-
labeled due to their short lifetime (usually below 1 s), which
made VBS incapable of reliably establishing the corresponding
sockets. The application protocols together with the number of
flows and the data volume are shown in Table 2, while the appli-
cations are shown in Table 3 and the web services ae shown in
Table 4. The data volume is presented here only for an overview
– the rest of the paper uses only the number of flows as the ref-
erence value.
We are going to publish our basic labeled dataset with full
packet payloads on our website [44]. Therefore, it can be used
by the research community as a reference benchmark for the
validation of network traffic classifiers.
5. Results
This section provides an overview of the classification results
of the different types of traffic by each of the classifiers. The
evaluation was performed on 3 datasets: a normal set, a set with
truncated packets, and a set with truncated flows. This section
presents a description of the most interesting results, but a dis-
cussion is later presented in Section 6 with the conclusions that
can be drawn from them. The following subsections present the
results for the normal dataset, while the results for the sets with
truncated packets or flows are discussed separately. All the ac-
curacy results are given in terms of flows. The methodology
Table 3: Applications in the dataset
Application Flows Megabytes
4Shared 144 13.39
America’s Army 350 61.15
BitTorrent clients (encrypted) 96399 3313.98
BitTorrent clients (non-encrypted) 261527 6779.95
Dropbox 93 128.66
eDonkey clients (obfuscated) 12835 8178.74
eDonkey clients (non-obfuscated) 13852 8480.48
Freenet 135 538.28
FTP clients (active) 126 341.17
FTP clients (passive) 122 270.46
iTunes 235 75.4
League of Legends 23 124.14
Pando Media Booster 13453 13.3
PPLive 1510 83.86
PPStream 1141 390.4
RDP clients 153837 13257.65
Skype (all) 2177 102.99
Skype (audio) 7 4.85
Skype (file transfer) 6 25.74
Skype (video) 7 41.16
Sopcast 424 109.34
Spotify 178 195.15
Steam 1205 255.84
TOR 185 47.14
World of Warcraft 22 1.98
used to compute the accuracy is shown in Section 3.3. The in-
terested reader may find the complete confusion matrix in the
technical report [39].
5.1. Application protocols
The evaluation of the classification of application protocols
is shown in Table 5. The columns present the percentage of
correctly and wrongly classified as well as unclassified flows
belonging to various application protocols by each classifier.
An important performance parameter of DPI-based tech-
niques is the completeness of their results (i.e., number of ap-
plications they can classify). This section evaluates 17 different
application protocols. As shown in Table 5, none of the tech-
niques is able to classify all of them. Among the different tech-
niques studied, nDPI and Libprotoident are the most complete,
classifying 15 out of 17. At the far end, L7-filter only classifies
9 of 17.
Another important aspect of DPI techniques is their ratio
of false positives (i.e., incorrect classifications). Usually tech-
niques leave the non-recognized flows as unclassified, trying to
decrease the number of false positives. Even though, both ver-
sions of L7-filter are characterized for producing a high number
of incorrect classifications (e.g., L7-filter-all classifies 85.79%
of HTTP traffic as Finger). Regarding the specific classifi-
cations, most of traditional application protocols (i.e., DNS,
HTTP, IMAP-STARTTLS, POP3-PLAIN, SMTP-PLAIN and
SSH) are generally well detected by all the techniques (e.g.,
accuracy between 70.92% and 100%). Unexpectedly, Libpro-
toident is the only classifier able to identify all the tested en-
crypted protocols. Regardless of the classifier, the undetected
encrypted traffic is usually identified as regular SSL. An inter-
esting case is presented by the classification of RTMP. Only
nDPI and Libprotoident are able to properly classify it. PACE
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Table 4: Web services in the dataset
Web service Flows Megabytes
4Shared 98 68.42
Amazon 602 51.02
Apple 477 90.22
Ask 171 1.86
Bing 456 36.84
Blogspot 235 10.53
CNN 247 3.66
Craigslist 179 4.09
Cyworld 332 13.06
Doubleclick 1989 11.24
eBay 281 8.31
Facebook 6953 747.35
Go.com 335 25.83
Google 6541 532.54
Instagram 9 0.22
Justin.tv 2326 126.33
LinkedIn 62 2.14
Mediafire 472 27.99
MSN 928 23.22
Myspace 2 2.54
Pinterest 189 3.64
Putlocker 103 71.92
QQ.com 753 10.46
Taobao 387 24.29
The Huffington Post 71 21.19
Tumblr 403 52.56
Twitter 1138 13.67
Vimeo 131 204.45
Vk.com 343 9.59
Wikipedia 6092 521.95
Windows Live 26 0.16
Wordpress 169 33.31
Yahoo 17373 937.07
YouTube 2534 1891.79
and OpenDPI classify this traffic as Flash. Although both traf-
fics are usually related, the classification as Flash cannot be
considered as being correct, as Flash is only a content con-
tainer. Flash content (audio, video or any other binary file)
can be transported using various applications protocols (e.g.,
HTTP, RTMP) or even different transport protocols (both TCP
and UDP).
5.2. Applications
The second level of classification studies the application that
uses its proprietary application-level protocols (e.g., BitTorrent,
Skype). The evaluation of the classification of various applica-
tions is shown in Table 6. The columns present the percentage
of correctly and wrongly classified as well as unclassified flows
belonging to various applications by each of the classifier.
At application level the most complete technique is PACE,
classifying 20 out of the 22 evaluted applications, followed by
nDPI (17) and Libprotoident (14). Again, L7-filter is among
the worst techniques (8), but it is overcomed by NBAR that
classifies only 4 applications.
Regarding the false positive ratio, the lowest percentage of
misclassified flows were obtained from PACE and OpenDPI.
Contrary, the highest ratio of misclassified flows is again ob-
tained from the classifications by both versions of L7-filter
(e.g., 97% of America’s Army traffic is classified as Skype and
RTP).
As shown in Table 6, the classification at application level
presents more problems than at application protocol level. It
is particularly striking that almost no classifier is able to com-
pletely classify all the flows (i.e., 100%) from a specific appli-
cation. This can be derived from the fact that usually appli-
cations use different internal operations that produce different
traffic. Therefore, techniques need a specific pattern for every
type of operation. For instance, the accuracy with Skype is al-
ways lower than 100% because none of the techniques is able to
classify neither Skype filetransfers nor videos. Among the dif-
ferent studied techniques, PACE is the most accurate followed
by nDPI and Libprotoident. Surprisingly, PACE presents severe
problems with a traditional application as FTP, almost non clas-
sifying all its traffic. Another interesting observations extracted
from the results are shown below:
• L7-filter, the most unreliable at this level, usually misclas-
sifies the flows as Skype and Finger. However, around 1/3
of the Skype flows are misclassified by it as RTP, Finger,
eDonkey, or NTP.
• The authors of traffic classifiers focus on popular appli-
cations, which either generate heavy data volume, or are
critical regarding QoS requirements. Non-encrypted Bit-
Torrent flows and Skype flows are the only groups of ap-
plications that are generally well detected by all the clas-
sifiers.
• America’s Army game is not classified by any tool. The
few correct classifications obtained by nDPI are due to the
recognition of some flows originated by the TeamSpeak
client integrated with the game.
5.3. Web services
The last level studied evaluates many different web services.
Because of clarity and understanding, we do not present the
results as a table but as a summary of the important outcomes.
The results with web services follow the outcomes obtained
at previous levels. PACE is the most complete and accurate
technique. The bad results of the rest of techniques are mainly
due to a not enough specific classification (e.g., Facebook traffic
classified as HTTP).
PACE recognizes 4Shared (84.69 %), Amazon (58.97 %),
Apple (0.84 %), Blogspot (3.83 %), eBay (67.97 %), Facebook
(80.79 %), Google (10.79 %), Instagram (88.89 %), Linkedin
(77.42 %), Mediafire (30.30 %), Myspace (100 %), QQ.com
(32.14 %), Twitter (71.18 %), Windows Live (96.15 %), Yahoo
(54.70 %), and YouTube (81.97 %). PACE does not have prob-
lems with recognizing SSL flows belonging to these services,
which means that PACE must use other techniques than just
looking directly into the packets to associate the flows with
the particular services, probably by analyzing the server cer-
tificates.
The commercial tool clearly improves upon its open-source
version OpenDPI that recognizes only Direct Download web-
sites: 4Shared (83.67 %) and MediaFire (30.30 %).
L7-filter recognizes only Apple (0.42 %). Furthermore, L7-
filter (especially L7-filter-all) is characterized by a very high
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Table 5: Evaluation of application protocols (% of flows)
Protocol Classifier % cor. % wr. % unc.
PACE 99.95 0.00 0.05
OpenDPI 99.99 0.00 0.01
L7-filter-all 99.62 0.05 0.33
DNS L7-filter-com 99.62 0.02 0.36
nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 99.96 0.00 0.04
NBAR 99.99 0.00 0.01
PACE 70.92 0.63 28.45
OpenDPI 95.68 0.59 3.73
L7-filter-all 3.58 96.04 0.38
HTTP L7-filter-com 35.25 10.28 54.47
nDPI 17.25 0.83 81.92
Libprotoident 99.80 0.07 0.13
NBAR 99.04 0.17 0.79
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 0.00 100.00
ICMP L7-filter-com 0.00 0.00 100.00
nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
L7-filter-all 100.00 0.00 0.00
IMAP L7-filter-com 100.00 0.00 0.00
STARTTLS nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
PACE 0.00 0.00 100.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 0.00 100.00
IMAP L7-filter-com 0.00 0.00 100.00
TLS nDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
PACE 99.96 0.00 0.04
OpenDPI 98.51 0.00 1.49
NETBIOS L7-filter-all 0.00 5.63 94.37
Name L7-filter-com 0.00 9.15 90.85
Service nDPI 99.97 0.00 0.03
Libprotoident 0.04 4.94 95.02
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
Protocol Classifier % cor. % wr. % unc.
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
NETBIOS L7-filter-all 9.09 0.00 90.91
Session L7-filter-com 9.09 0.00 90.91
Service nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
SAMBA L7-filter-all 100.00 0.00 0.00
Session L7-filter-com 100.00 0.00 0.00
Service nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
L7-filter-all 99.86 0.14 0.00
NTP L7-filter-com 99.86 0.13 0.01
nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
L7-filter-all 100.00 0.00 0.00
POP3 L7-filter-com 100.00 0.00 0.00
PLAIN nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
PACE 0.00 0.00 100.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 5.93 94.06
POP3 L7-filter-com 0.00 0.99 99.01
TLS nDPI 88.12 0.00 11.88
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
PACE 0.00 0.00 100.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 23.54 76.46
RTMP L7-filter-com 0.00 23.54 76.46
nDPI 70.90 15.87 13.23
Libprotoident 86.51 0.26 13.23
NBAR 0.00 0.26 99.74
Protocol Classifier % cor. % wr. % unc.
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
L7-filter-all 100.00 0.00 0.00
SMTP L7-filter-com 100.00 0.00 0.00
PLAIN nDPI 100.00 0.00 0.00
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 100.00 0.00 0.00
PACE 0.00 0.00 100.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 0.00 100.00
SMTP L7-filter-com 0.00 0.00 100.00
TLS nDPI 3.85 0.00 96.15
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 78.26 0.00 21.74
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 100.00 0.00
SOCKSv5 L7-filter-com 0.00 100.00 0.00
nDPI 92.99 0.00 7.01
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 93.98 0.51 5.51
OpenDPI 93.98 0.12 5.90
L7-filter-all 94.19 0.36 5.45
SSH L7-filter-com 94.19 0.12 5.69
nDPI 93.98 0.80 5.22
Libprotoident 94.19 0.36 5.45
NBAR 93.71 0.64 5.65
PACE 3.51 0.00 96.49
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 7.02 92.98
Webdav L7-filter-com 0.00 7.02 92.98
nDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE
OpenDPI
L7-filter-all
L7-filter-com
nDPI
Libprotoident
NBAR
number of misclassified flows belonging to web services (usu-
ally 80–99 %). The flows are recognized in a vast majority as
Finger and Skype.
nDPI recognizes Amazon (83.89 %), Apple (74.63 %),
Blogspot (4.68 %), Doubleclick (85.92 %), eBay (72.24 %),
Facebook (80.14 %), Google (82.39 %), Yahoo (83.16 %),
Wikipedia (68.96 %), and YouTube (82.16 %) being the second
best technique at this level.
Unlike at previous levels, Libprotoident recognizes only the
Yahoo (2.36 %) web service. This result is understandable given
that Libprotoident only uses the first 4 bytes of packet payload
to classify a flow, making considerably more difficult a specific
classification as web service.
The worst technique at this level is NBAR that does not rec-
ognize any web services.
5.4. Impact of packet truncation
An important characteristic of each DPI tool is the amount
of information needed from each packet to identify the traf-
fic. That significantly influences the classification speed and
the resources needed. Furthermore, many traffic traces are pub-
lished with payload truncated up to a certain number of bytes
per packet for privacy reasons. As mentioned before, Libpro-
toident is the only tool, which is advertised to use the particular
extent of the examined packets, namely first 4 bytes. There-
fore, in order to discover the internal properties of each tool,
we decided to test the impact of packet truncation. This subsec-
tion presents the differences between the classification results
for the normal dataset and the dataset with truncated Ethernet
frames to the first 70 B.
Truncation of packets has a considerable impact on the clas-
sification of most application protocols by all tools except
Libprotoident and NBAR, which tend to maintain their normal
accuracy. This suggests that NBAR can be somehow imple-
mented as Libprotoident to classify application protocols while
the rest of techniques base their classification on the complete
flow. L7-filter is not able to detect DNS traffic on this set, while
all the other classifiers present the accuracy of over 99 %. Un-
expectedly, NBAR cannot detect NTP on the normal set, while
it detects it 100 % correctly on the set with truncated packets.
We can not present a verificable reason of this result given that
NBAR is not an open-sourcer tool.
At application level, only Libprotoident is able to keep its
normal accuracy whereas the rest of techniques considerably
decreases their accuracies.
Regarding the web services level, only nDPI is able to recog-
nize some web services in this set. Exceptionally, the detection
rate is almost the same as for the normal set. Other classifiers
tend to leave such traffic as unknown.
5.5. Impact of flow truncation
Another major concern is how many packets are needed in
order to classify each flow. That depends on the classification
tool as well as on the application or protocol, which we want to
identify. However, the documentation of the traffic classifiers
do not cover these issues, although they are very important for
conserving disk space while publishing data traces used to test
the tools. Therefore, we decided to study the impact of flow
truncation. This subsection presents the differences between
the classification results for the normal dataset and the dataset
with truncated flows to the first 10 packets.
Truncation of flows does not have any noticeable impact on
the classification of application protocols. This result suggests
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Table 6: Evaluation of applications (% of flows)
Application Classifier % cor. % wr. % unc.
PACE 27.08 0.00 72.92
OpenDPI 27.08 0.00 72.92
L7-filter-all 0.00 1.39 98.61
4Shared L7-filter-com 0.00 0.00 100.00
nDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 0.00 0.00 100.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 97.71 2.29
America’s L7-filter-com 0.00 97.43 2.57
Army nDPI 4.00 0.00 96.00
Libprotoident 0.00 89.14 10.86
NBAR 0.00 72.00 28.00
PACE 78.68 0.05 21.27
OpenDPI 0.27 0.00 99.73
BitTorrent L7-filter-all 40.54 10.17 49.29
clients L7-filter-com 40.62 7.30 52.08
(encrypted) nDPI 54.41 0.18 45.41
Libprotoident 60.31 0.02 39.67
NBAR 1.29 0.63 98.08
PACE 99.87 0.00 0.13
OpenDPI 80.61 0.00 19.39
BitTorrent L7-filter-all 94.56 0.49 4.95
clients L7-filter-com 94.60 0.42 4.98
(non-encrypted) nDPI 99.41 0.02 0.57
Libprotoident 99.30 0.00 0.70
NBAR 77.84 0.36 21.80
PACE 94.62 0.00 5.38
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 0.00 100.00
Dropbox L7-filter-com 0.00 0.00 100.00
nDPI 98.92 0.00 1.08
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 36.06 7.26 56.68
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
eDonkey L7-filter-all 11.64 16.59 71.77
clients L7-filter-com 11.64 11.09 77.27
(obfuscated) nDPI 11.04 2.67 86.29
Libprotoident 11.47 0.00 88.53
NBAR 0.00 15.93 84.07
PACE 16.50 3.74 79.76
OpenDPI 3.98 0.30 95.72
eDonkey L7-filter-all 17.97 16.32 65.71
clients L7-filter-com 17.99 10.79 71.22
(non-obfuscated) nDPI 15.57 2.28 82.23
Libprotoident 17.86 0.31 81.83
NBAR 2.05 11.19 86.76
PACE 79.26 0.00 20.74
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 20.00 80.00
Freenet L7-filter-com 0.00 14.07 85.93
nDPI 0.00 3.70 96.30
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 15.56 84.44
PACE 5.56 0.00 94.44
OpenDPI 97.62 0.00 2.38
FTP L7-filter-all 5.56 92.06 2.38
clients L7-filter-com 5.56 90.47 3.97
(active) nDPI 98.41 0.00 1.59
Libprotoident 100.00 0.00 0.00
NBAR 50.79 0.00 49.21
Application Classifier % cor. % wr. % unc.
PACE 4.92 0.00 95.08
OpenDPI 67.21 0.00 32.79
FTP L7-filter-all 4.92 76.23 23.77
clients L7-filter-com 4.92 73.77 26.23
(passive) nDPI 72.95 0.00 27.05
Libprotoident 73.77 22.95 32.80
NBAR 50.00 0.00 50.00
PACE 77.45 0.00 22.55
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 63.83 6.81 29.36
iTunes L7-filter-com 63.83 0.00 36.17
nDPI 13.19 0.00 86.81
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 0.00 13.04 86.96
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
League L7-filter-all 0.00 69.57 30.43
of L7-filter-com 0.00 4.35 95.65
Legends nDPI 0.00 13.04 86.96
Libprotoident 0.00 4.35 95.65
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 99.45 0.39 0.16
OpenDPI 99.23 0.54 0.23
Pando L7-filter-all 0.00 0.74 99.26
Media L7-filter-com 0.00 0.55 99.45
Booster nDPI 99.26 0.63 0.11
Libprotoident 99.26 0.41 0.33
NBAR 0.00 0.36 99.64
PACE 88.21 0.00 11.79
OpenDPI 0.07 0.13 99.80
L7-filter-all 0.00 56.03 43.97
PPLive L7-filter-com 0.00 17.15 82.85
nDPI 43.91 1.05 55.04
Libprotoident 43.91 1.05 55.04
NBAR 0.00 0.40 99.60
PACE 79.32 0.00 20.68
OpenDPI 0.79 0.00 99.21
L7-filter-all 0.00 38.39 61.61
PPStream L7-filter-com 0.00 15.07 84.93
nDPI 0.53 0.26 99.21
Libprotoident 0.96 0.00 99.04
NBAR 0.00 5.26 94.74
PACE 99.69 0.00 0.31
OpenDPI 99.70 0.00 0.30
L7-filter-all 0.00 92.25 7.75
RDP L7-filter-com 0.00 92.25 7.75
clients nDPI 99.69 0.02 0.29
Libprotoident 99.66 0.01 0.33
NBAR 0.00 0.67 99.33
PACE 83.51 5.05 11.44
OpenDPI 38.49 0.32 61.19
L7-filter-all 59.21 31.70 9.09
Skype L7-filter-com 62.52 24.67 12.81
(all) nDPI 99.82 0.00 0.18
Libprotoident 88.75 0.00 11.25
NBAR 70.37 3.40 26.23
PACE 100.00 0.00 0.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 85.71 14.29 0.00
Skype L7-filter-com 100.00 0.00 0.00
(audio) nDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
Application Classifier % cor. % wr. % unc.
PACE 0.00 100.00 0.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 100.00 0.00
Skype L7-filter-com 0.00 100.00 0.00
(file transfer) nDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 0.00 100.00 0.00
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 100.00 0.00
Skype L7-filter-com 0.00 100.00 0.00
(video) nDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
Libprotoident 0.00 0.00 100.00
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 66.27 3.07 30.66
OpenDPI 66.27 2.59 31.14
L7-filter-all 0.00 99.06 0.94
Sopcast L7-filter-com 0.00 74.76 25.24
nDPI 63.68 1.18 35.14
Libprotoident 46.70 0.24 53.06
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE 37.64 2.25 60.11
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 43.26 56.74
Spotify L7-filter-com 0.00 10.11 89.89
nDPI 0.56 3.93 95.51
Libprotoident 0.56 0.00 99.44
NBAR 0.00 0.56 99.44
PACE 55.19 0.75 44.06
OpenDPI 0.33 0.00 99.67
L7-filter-all 0.00 65.89 34.11
Steam L7-filter-com 0.00 4.73 95.27
nDPI 76.02 0.42 23.56
Libprotoident 75.85 0.00 24.15
NBAR 0.00 0.58 99.42
PACE 85.95 0.00 14.05
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
L7-filter-all 0.00 0.00 100.00
TOR L7-filter-com 0.00 0.00 100.00
nDPI 33.51 0.00 66.49
Libprotoident 33.51 0.00 66.49
NBAR 0.00 2.16 97.84
PACE 27.27 0.00 72.73
OpenDPI 0.00 0.00 100.00
World L7-filter-all 0.00 86.36 13.64
of L7-filter-com 0.00 22.73 77.27
Warcraft nDPI 13.64 13.64 72.72
Libprotoident 13.64 0.00 86.36
NBAR 0.00 0.00 100.00
PACE
OpenDPI
L7-filter-all
L7-filter-com
nDPI
Libprotoident
NBAR
PACE
OpenDPI
L7-filter-all
L7-filter-com
nDPI
Libprotoident
NBAR
that the classification of application protocols relies on patterns
or signatures extracted from the first packets of the flows.
Similar behavior is obatained at application level. However,
in this case the impact on the classification of applications is
noticeable – the detection rate decreases. The only exception is
Libprotoident, which provides the same results as for the nor-
mal dataset. Therefore, this insinuate that the classification of
some applications probably rely on techniques based on statis-
tics (e.g., Machine Learning). FTP in the active mode is a very
interesting case, as Libprotoident maintains its 100 % accuracy,
while the accuracy of the other classifiers drops to 5.56 %. An
strange case is presented with Plain eDonkey traffic, as the best
classification accuracy (45.28 %) we obtained by using PACE
on the set with truncated flows, while the accuracy on the nor-
mal set was only 16.50 %.
The percentage of correctly classified web services is usually
the same or nearly the same as for the normal set.
6. Discussion
This section extracts the outcomes from the results obtained
during the performance comparison. Also, we discuss the limi-
tations of our study.
As shown in the previous section, PACE is the best classi-
fier for most of the studied classification groups. This high
ranking is due to the ability of providing the results on var-
ious levels, as for example HTTP:generic:facebook. Other
classifiers do not offer this ability at all and only one chosen
level is given, so, for example, they do not offer the possibil-
ity to account the HTTP or SSL traffic, while they recognize
the web service of the transported content. However, PACE
also is not totally consistent in that matter. Facebook videos
(which we observed as transported by HTTP) were detected as,
for example, FLASH:no_subprotocols:facebook, while the live
video streams from Justin.tv using RTMP, were classified as
FLASH:no_subprotocols:not_detected. So, we do not have the
knowledge from the results obtained from the classifier which
application protocol was used (HTTP, RTMP, or other), because
the content container level is returned instead. Ideally, the DPI
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techniques should provide results on all the possible levels, as
HTTP:FLASH:VIDEO:YOUTUBE, so that kind of consistent
accounting could be performed. However, PACE is a commer-
cial tool not accessible for all the research community. Among
the available open-source tools, nDPI and Libprotoident reveal
as the most reliable solutions. Surprisingly for us, Libpro-
toident achieves very good results without giving a noticeable
number of false classifications by using the first four bytes of
payload for each direction. On the other hand, L7-filter and
NBAR perform poorly in classifying the traffic from our dataset.
We did not observe large differences between the classifica-
tions performed on the normal dataset and the set with truncated
flows to maximum 10 packets. The set with truncated packets
is usually much worse classified than the other sets by all tools
except Libprotoident, which maintains the same accuracy. We
found that our modified version of L7-filter-com provides over-
all better results than the default L7-filter-all by increased num-
ber of correct classifications and greatly reduced rate of mis-
classifications (especially, regarding the web services).
Nonetheless, the previous conclusions are obviously tied to
the particular application protocols, applications, and web ser-
vices included in our dataset. Although we tried our best to
emulate the real behavior of the users, many applications, be-
haviors and configurations are not represented on it. Because
of that it has some limitations that we discuss next:
• In our study, we evaluated 17 well-known application pro-
tocols, 19 applications (including 4 in various configura-
tions), and 34 web services. The results obtained from
the different classifiers are directly related to those groups.
Thus, the introduction of different groups could arise dif-
ferent outcomes. However, all the groups are evaluated
individually and, therefore, the addition of new groups to
our dataset would not change the results presented in this
paper.
• The traffic generated for building the dataset, although has
been manually and realistically created, is artificial. The
backbone traffic would carry different behaviors of the
groups that are not fully represented in our dataset (e.g.,
P2P clients running on port 80). The performance of the
tools studied might not be directly extrapolated from the
current results. However, the artificially created traffic al-
lowed us to publish the dataset with full packet payloads.
• The poor performance of NBAR and L7-filter might be
affected by the characteristics of our dataset. Thus, the re-
liability of previous works based on them is not called into
question. Different configurations [42, 45, 10] and differ-
ent or older classification groups would probably produce
different results.
• The classification levels have considerable impact on the
results. For instance, classifying Facebook, Google or
Twitter is currently not possible by Libprotoident, how-
ever it is possible by nDPI and PACE.
• The amount of data available would also have impacted
on the performance. The study presented in this paper is
performed with full payload packets. However, in other
works the traces are usually collected with a few bytes of
data [46, 13, 47] (e.g., 96 bytes) in order to avoid packet
loss, disk space, and privacy issues. For this scenario, it
seems that Libprotoident is a more suitable solution, giv-
ing it only uses the first 4 bytes of every packet.
• The nature, distribution, and heterogeneity of the traffic
would also impact the performance. The amount of classes
detected by PACE is considerably bigger than detected by
the rest of the classifiers, which makes PACE more suit-
able for heterogeneous scenarios. Also, PACE and nDPI
are able to classify traffic in asymmetric scenarios.
7. Related work
This section reviews the literature related to the comparison
of DPI tools. The OpenDPI tool amounts for most of the publi-
cations [6, 48, 10, 7, 49]. According to [6], the test performed
by the European Networking Tester Center (EANTC) in 2009
resulted in 99 % of detection and accuracy for popular P2P pro-
tocols by OpenDPI. The big amount of flows marked as un-
known by OpenDPI was confirmed in [48], where the authors
made an effort to calculate various parameters for traffic orig-
inated from different applications: number of flows, data vol-
ume, flow sizes, number of concurrent flows, and inter-arrival
times. The study was based on 3.297 TB of data collected dur-
ing 14 days from an access network with connected around 600
households. 80.1 % of the flows, amounting for 64 % of the
traffic volume, were marked as unknown by OpenDPI.
In [6], the authors study the impact of per-packet payload
sampling (i.e., packet truncation) and per-flow packet sampling
(i.e., collect only the first packets of a flow) on the performance
of OpenDPI. The results show that OpenDPI is able to keep the
accuracy higher than 90-99% with only the first 4-10 packets of
a flow. The impact by the per-packet payload sampling is con-
siderably higher. Their results use as ground-truth the dataset
labeled by OpenDPI with no sampling. Thus, the actual classi-
fication of the dataset is unknown and no possible comparison
with our work can be done.
Similar work, performed by the same authors, is described
in [7]. The goal was to find out what is the suggested num-
ber of packets from each flow, which needs to be inspected by
OpenDPI in order to achieve good accuracy, while maintaining
a low computational cost. The focus was on Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
protocols. The test was performed on a 3 GB randomly selected
subset of flows from the data collected at an access link of an
institution over 3 days. The authors found that inspecting only
10 packets from each flow lowered the classification abilities of
P2P flows by OpenDPI by just 0.85 % comparing to the classi-
fication of full flows, while saving more than 9 % of time.
In [10], the authors tested the accuracy of L7-filter and
OpenDPI, and they also built their own version of L7-filter with
enhanced abilities of classification of the UDP traffic. The data
used in the experiment were collected by Wireshark, while the
applications were running in the background. The data were
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split into 27 traces, each for one application, where all the ap-
plications were supported by both L7-filter and OpenDPI. Other
flows were removed from the dataset. However, they do not ex-
plain how they validate the process of the isolation of the dif-
ferent applications. The obtained precision was 100 % in all
the cases (none of the classification tools gave a false positive),
while the recall deviated from 67 % for the standard L7-filter,
through 74 % for their own implementation of L7-filter, and
87 % for OpenDPI.
Fukuda compared in [47] the performance of L7-filter and
OpenDPI on the backbone traffic. The dataset used is character-
ized as being in majority asymmetric and containing the pack-
ets truncated after 96 Bytes. The ground-truth is labeled using
a port-based technique and then the three DPI-based techniques
are compared. The results show that the DPI-based techniques
are only able to classify 40-60% of the traffic in this scenario.
In [8], the developers of Libprotoident evaluated the accuracy
of the classification of this tool and compared the results with
OpenDPI, Nmap, and L7-filter. The ground-truth was estab-
lished by PACE, so only the flows recognized by PACE were
taken into account during the experiment. The accuracy was
tested on two datasets: one taken from the Auckland university
network, and one from an Internet Service Provider (ISP). On
the first dataset, Libprotoident had the lowest error rate of less
than 1 % (OpenDPI: 1.5 %, L7-filter: 12.3 %, Nmap: 48 %.).
On the second dataset, Libprotoident achieved the error rate
of 13.7 %, while OpenDPI 23.3 %, L7-filter 22 %, and Nmap
68.9 %. The authors claim that Libprotoident identified 65 % of
BitTorrent traffic and nearly 100 % of HTTP, SMTP, and SSL.
Same authors also compared in [9] four open-source DPI-based
tools (i.e., nDPI, Tstat, Libprotoident, and L7-filter). Similarly
to us, they artificially built a labeled dataset using a complicate
mix of filters in an isolated host. Unlike us, their trace is not
available to the community so no further comparison is possi-
ble. However, their results confirms some of the findings of our
paper presenting nDPI and Libprotoident as the most accurate
open-source DPI-based tools.
Another lightweight packet inspection approach was pro-
posed in [50]. The authors developed PortLoad, which was
designed to be characterized by the speed of port-based classi-
fiers, while maintaining the accuracy of DPI tools. The authors
showed that almost all the matching strings start (99.98 %) and
finish (90.77 %) in the first 32 bytes of payload. Only the first
packet in each direction is processed. PortLoad was compared
against L7-filter and the port-based approach. The experimen-
tal evaluation showed that the processing time is cut down by
more than 97 % comparing to L7-filter, while the accuracy was
assessed to be 74 %.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no accessible research
studies or reports about the accuracy of NBAR. However, an ex-
periment was made to assess how big amount of network traffic
is classified by NBAR and L7-filter, and how big amount of traf-
fic is left as unknown [51]. The authors captured by Wireshark
all the packets flowing in a local network of an IT company
during 1 hour. From 27 502 observed packets, 12.56 % were
reported as unknown by NBAR, and 30.44 % were reported as
unknown by L7-filter.
A very comprehensive review of different methods for traffic
classification was made in 2013 by Silvio Valenti et al. [52].
The authors refer to 68 different positions in the literature and
cover the topic from the basis to more advanced topics, mostly
dealing with Machine Learning Algorithms (MLAs).
8. Conclusions
This paper presents a reliable evaluation of the accuracy of
some of the most well-known DPI-based network traffic clas-
sifiers. We compared the precision of six tools (i.e., PACE,
OpenDPI, L7-filter, nDPI, Libprotoident, and NBAR), which
are usually used for traffic classification. The results obtained
in Section 5 and further discussed in Section 6 show that PACE
is, for the majority of protocols, applications, and web services
included in our dataset, the most reliable solution for traffic
classification. Among the open-source tools, nDPI and Libpro-
toident present the best results. The choice between them would
depend on the scenario or the level on which we would like
to obtain the results. On the other hand, NBAR and L7-filter
present several inaccuracies that make them not recommend-
able for network traffic classification in their current form.
In order to make the study trustworthy, we created a dataset
using VBS [20]. This tool associates the name of the process
to each flow making its labeling totally reliable. The dataset
of more than 750 K flows contains traffic from popular applica-
tions. Trying to be as representative as possible, we selected the
groups and applications based on Internet rankings. However,
the robustness of our evaluation methodology is independent of
the applications selected, as we provide the accuracy per ap-
plication. Also, this dataset allows the validation of different
techniques on different levels (i.e., application protocol, appli-
cation, and web service). The total amount of data properly
labeled is 51.93 GB. Furthermore, and more important, we re-
leased to the research community this dataset with full payload,
so it can be used as a common reference for the comparison and
validation of network traffic classifiers.
Although this study is complete, the continuous evolution
of the network applications and the DPI-based techniques al-
lows a periodical updated of the evaluation. For instance, this
evaluation can be updated by adding new applications and web
services to the dataset (e.g., Netflix) and by introducing new
classification tools to the study (e.g., NBAR2 or Tstat). In this
paper, we focused on the reliability of the DPI tools, however, a
possible line of future work can be related to their deployment
for real-time classification (i.e., scalability and computational
cost).
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